Road accidents are one of the biggest problems faced by contemporary society; this is prooved by the wide regulation that is emerging in our days around this issue in order to prevent them. However, in many occasions, the legislature does not give right incentives which should be taken into account if politicians really want to achieve a more cautious behavior by drivers. Through theoretical modeling, under the assumptions that pose a few doctrines, to seek the appropriate stimuli for this purpose becomes a complex task, more typical for the interdisciplinary field of economic analysis of Law.
This time it proposes a model of the driver through the classical theory (micro-) economic, under the assumptions of full rationality and perfect information, which will be later modified by deviations from these assumptions, in order to approach a little more to a real driver.
The results confirm what had been claimed for much of the doctrine (especially criminalists) against the excess of regulation in the field of road safety; alternatives are also proposed to this whole mess by implementing new theories like the agency behavior theory, so regulators could benefit remove the deviations proposed by these theories: Assimetric information and the existence of moral incentives.
Download here the working paper: Incentives to Speed vs. Sanctions: A Theoretical Analysis
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